Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between the law of evidence and police governance in Ireland. I would like to consider the extent to which evidentiary rules and practices promote transparency, accountability and best practice within law enforcement and the extent to which they undermine these values. The disparate, unstructured nature of the Irish law of evidence complicates the process of assessing its contribution to police governance. The paper will dwell in particular on the attitude of the courts to the propriety of their role in using evidentiary rules as a means of indirectly supervising the police. Account will also be taken of certain legislative initiatives relating to criminal evidence that potentially impact upon the issue of police accountability.
Should the Courts Police the Police?
A good place to begin is the normative question whether promoting police accountability is a proper function of the law of evidence. Historically, the courts adhered to the view that the investigation of offences should be divorced from the trial of offenders. In Kuruma v R, Lord Goddard famously stated:
[T]he test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters at issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained. [1955] AC 197.
Wigmore, among others, supported this approach on the basis that the trial of a criminal suspect is not a suitable forum for resolving incidental questions of wrongdoing on the part of law enforcement [35; para.2183] . The traditional common law view has since given way to a vision of criminal justice as a unitary, seamless process in which police conduct has a direct bearing on the admissibility of evidence at trial. 2 The question remains, however, whether the courts should play a role in police governance and, if so, how active that role should be.
The separation of powers is a central plank in the case against this form of judicial activism. Lord Goddard"s understanding of evidentiary relevance voiced in Kuruma is rooted in judicial deference to the criminal investigative function of the executive branch and the policy and oversight functions of the legislative branch. 3 While this perception may seem outdated when applied to the investigation of ordinary offences, it continues to resonate in the context of extraordinary offences which threaten the security of the Irish State. 4 Judicial economy provides a further justification for divorcing the investigative process from the trial process. According to this argument, the conduct of law enforcement officers in the gathering of evidence is secondary at best to the primary issue of the accused"s guilt or innocence. 5 Consequently, enquiries into allegations of investigative misconduct are a needless drain on judicial time and resources and distract judge and jury from their respective fact-finding and adjudicative functions. This position finds support in the related argument that other mechanisms outside the trial process exist to tackle this form of wrongdoing and indeed are better suited to the purpose. 6 In R v Collins [1987] 1 SCR 265, 38 DLR (4 th ) 508, Lamer J lamented the cost of judicial deference: "… it is true that the cost of excluding the evidence would be high: someone who was found guilty at trial of a relatively serious offence will evade conviction. Such a result could bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the administration of justice would be brought into greater disrepute, at least in my respectful view, if this court did not exclude the evidence and dissociate itself from the conduct of the police in this case …"; at p. "It is no part of a judge"s function to exercise disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them. If it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil law; if it was obtained legally but in breach of the rules of conduct for the police, this is a matter for the appropriate disciplinary authority to deal with. What the judge at the trial is concerned with is not how the evidence sought to be adduced by the prosecution has been obtained but with how it is used by the prosecution at the trial." R v Sang [1980] The strongest argument in favour of judicial intervention in the face of investigative misconduct lies in the constitutional duty of the courts to ensure that the personal rights of the accused are respected and vindicated [2, 4, 16] . 7 If the police infringe a suspect's protected rights, in all likelihood the prosecution will pay an evidentiary price: the evidence may be excluded at trial or, if admitted and relied upon, may render the conviction susceptible to challenge on appeal. 8 This swathe of constitutional protection is buttressed by the increasingly penetrating reach of international human rights law [4] .
The need for trial courts to be alert to police wrongdoing also derives from the fundamental concept of fairness within the trial process [28, 34; 9 It is reflected in a myriad of evidentiary rules and principles and a residual exclusionary discretion. 10 These imperatives necessarily bring the judicial branch within the spectrum of police governance. Where the vindication of personal rights or adherence to fair procedures trumps police policy or behaviour, it may have the incidental effect of promoting transparency and accountability. As will be seen later, the extent to which the courts engage in this measure of oversight and the enthusiasm with which they embrace the task varies from one context to the next.
Constitutional considerations aside, the need for the trial judges to be alert to the professionalism of the police is also a common sense component of criminal trial practice. Determinations about the admissibility of items of evidence turn more often than not on considerations of relevance and reliability. Enquiries into the reliability of prosecution evidence invariably touch upon the conduct of the gardaí in gathering the information in question. Thus, where police misconduct has a direct bearing on the quality of the evidence presented, the courts must take a stand. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court quashed a conviction for murder in People (DPP) v Diver on the ground that the gardaí had failed to record properly a custodial interview with the accused. Hardiman J stated in part:
I wish to reiterate that the gardaí are not entitled to exercise total editorial control in recording what has been said. Nor are they entitled to cherry pick what is to be recorded. In this case, the omission of a series of denials is utterly unacceptable. It is not that the gardaí are required, when they are relying on written notes of an interview with an accused, to record what an interviewee has said verbatim. Regulation 23 requires that the record of the interview be "as complete as practicable". It must be a fair record of what was said and it is important to provide sufficient context to allow for an evaluation of what is said, especially where, as here, the accused was allegedly making ambiguous or inconclusive verbal statements and manifesting symptoms of distress.
[2005] 3 Irish Reports 270 at 280.
The failure of the gardaí to meet the legal standards pertaining to the recording of the interview crossed the constitutional line of a trial in due course of law. But at the level of ordinary common law, it tainted the evidence itself rendering it unreliable for purposes of admissibility.
Governance in Practice
The Irish law of criminal evidence is grounded in exclusionary rules derived from common law, constitutional and statutory bases. Many of these rules are designed to protect an accused and to promote fairness in the criminal trial but have the additional consequence of promoting police accountability. Judicial adherence to rules and principles of this kind safeguards against wrongful convictions and encourages best investigative practices.
A classic example is the controversial rule against unconstitutionally obtained evidence which, in the Irish context, has generated a vibrant discourse among judges, policy-makers and academics [23, 24; ch.7, 27; para.19.14, 25, 32; ch.9]. In People (AG) v O'Brien [1965] Irish Reports 142, the Supreme Court famously broke with the common law tradition and fashioned an exclusionary rule predicated upon the vindication of constitutional rights. Walsh J stated:
The Courts in exercising the judicial powers of government of the State must recognise the paramount position of constitutional rights and must uphold the objection of an accused person to the admissibility at his trial of evidence obtained or procured by the State or its servants or agents as a result of a deliberate and conscious violation of the constitutional rights of the accused person where no extraordinary excusing circumstances exist, such as the imminent destruction of vital evidence or the need to rescue a victim in peril [1965] Irish Reports 142 at 170.
The need to establish a "deliberate and conscious" breach of rights on the part of the State implied that the Irish exclusionary rule was fashioned with the additional consideration of deterrence in mind. The requirement spawned a divisive line of jurisprudence 11 14 The law governing the admissibility of confessions provides a related, apt illustration. A trial judge will not permit the prosecution to adduce evidence of a confession unless he or she is satisfied that the confession was voluntary and the product of fair procedures. 15 A confession may also fall foul of the Irish exclusionary rule if it was causatively linked to a breach of the accused"s constitutional rights and there were no extraordinary excusing circumstances that would justify its admission. 16 Confession evidence represents a highwatermark in terms of Ironically, although almost 20 years have elapsed since the Supreme Court"s decision in Healy, the affirmative steps required of the gardaí to guarantee respect for the right of access to legal advice remain a source of contention. 17 Custodial detention is just one context which reflects an inherent imbalance between the respective capacities of the prosecution and defence to gather evidence for use in a criminal trial. Investigations routinely involve the police in the gathering of prosecution evidence which will be rigorously tested by the defence, but the police may also be required to seek out and preserve evidence which may independently assist the defence [18, 32; pp.718-725] . This is just one potentially complex aspect of evidence-gathering which leaves a measure of discretion in the hands of the gardaí subject to a relatively benign form of judicial supervision. Challenges to the duty to preserve are seemingly ubiquitous but successful challenges are rare indeed. 18 This may be attributable to various causes such as the extreme nature of the remedy (an order prohibiting the trial) 19 and a lack of emphasis within our system on the positive evidentiary rights of the defence [17] . The need to address the conditions on the ground that have led to the proliferation of missing evidence cases was implicit in the comments of Denham J in the recent case of People (DPP) v Savage [2008] IESC 39. The learned justice issued a common sense direction to the gardaí in the following terms:
It would be best practice for An Garda Síochána to give notice, to inform an accused, or a potential accused, of the intention to destroy a vehicle or evidence which may reasonably be materially relevant to a trial, giving such person time to have the vehicle, or evidence, examined, if they so wished. Such a notice could be served at the same time as a Notice of Intention to Prosecute. The notice could inform of the place where the vehicle was, that it could be examined, and of the intention to destroy the vehicle at a future date, perhaps one month hence. it is critical evidence of a serious road accident, steps should be taken to preserve the evidence until trial, or until the accused (who may not be the owner) had had time to have the evidence examined by his experts. … Just as it would not be appropriate to return a bloody knife at the scene of an assault to its owner, until DNA or other forensic evidence is taken, so too would it be best practice not to return defective tyres to their owner at the
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The Irish law of evidence is sprinkled with other less prevalent examples of judicial governance such as the principle that a witness may not identify an accused in court in the absence of evidence that the gardaí conducted an appropriate pre-trial identification procedure [21, 24; pp.185-208; 32; pp.869-872]. 21 The formal identification parade with its attendant safeguards constitutes the norm but in exceptional circumstances the gardaí may have recourse to identification procedures of a more informal nature. 22 Much judicial ink has been spilled over when and how informal parades should be conducted.
People (DPP) v O'Reilly [1990] 2 Irish
Reports 415 provides one colourful example. An 81-year-old woman had been the victim of a theft in her home. About two months after the crime, she was brought by the gardaí to the local town where, from the vantage of a garda car, she tentatively identified the accused from a group of 5 people who entered the courthouse from the street. "I think that"s him here" she said "I didn"t get a good look at him". An hour later, a group of 4 persons emerged from the courthouse and the woman declared: "That"s him, that"s him, the fellow with the ugly face". At trial, one of the garda officers was cross-examined as to why no identification parade had been held. He stated that in his 23 years in the guards he had never had occasion to hold an identification parade. 23 He also expressed his view that an informal parade was far more beneficial to a defendant. In the Court of Criminal Appeal, O"Flaherty J concluded that the explanation for not holding a formal identification parade was less than satisfactory. He noted that the decision as to what is most beneficial for an accused in the preparation and conduct of his defence must be primarily a matter for the accused and his legal adviser.
O'Reilly is also instructive in so far as it is one of many instances in which a court tempers its criticism of the gardaí with an acknowledgement that they acted in good faith. O"Flaherty J stated that the court was in no doubt that the garda officer in question "acted out of a dutiful though mistaken conception as to what was right and proper in the circumstances of this case."
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Judicial and Legislative Reticence
At the same time, not all rules and practices promote police accountability; on the contrary, closer scrutiny of the Irish law of evidence reveals a panoply of principles, procedures and practices which may undermine transparency and condone abuses.
scene of a serious road traffic accident, or to enable them to be destroyed until an accused or relevant party has had an opportunity to have them analysed." For an earlier view, see When questioned by counsel for the accused, the garda officer could not describe any of the other individuals who passed into and out of the courthouse at the relevant time: [1990] 2 IR 415 at 420. 24 
Ibid.
It is noteworthy that several of these measures are legislative in origin. A notable example is the caveat, which appears in various enactments including the Criminal Justice Act 1984 25 and the Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Act 2009, 26 that failure on the part of the gardaí to adhere to prescribed standards shall not necessarily render any evidence obtained inadmissible. 27 Provisos of this kind walk a fine line between the need to ensure respect for the substance of regulatory regimes and the desire to spare the gardaí from slavish adherence to requirements that may be perceived to be technical in nature. It is the task of the trial judge to determine which side of that line a particular failure to observe a regulation falls 28 A majority of the court held that the common law powers of the gardaí to take and retain forensic samples survived the enactment of the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence) Act 1990. The implication is that the gardaí can sidestep the conditions and safeguards set out in the Act and its regulations through the expedient of asking a suspect to "volunteer" a sample for purposes of forensic testing. 30 In a trenchant dissent, Fennelly J remarked:
Did the Oireachtas intend to lay down a regime which was to apply, where samples are taken by consent from persons in custody, while the gardaí could simply ignore that regime by seeking consent based on common law? That would be absurd. It would be inherently inconsistent and potentially unfair. 
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The key fact is that the person from whom the sample is taken is in custody. In matters of criminal law and procedure, the courts lean towards interpretations of statutory provisions which favour the rights of the accused person. In the present case, there is the additional factor that the Garda Síochána had laid it down as a matter of policy that consent should be sought outside the scope of the Act and that, only in the event of refusal, should the statutory procedures be applied [2009] 1 Irish Law Reports Monthly 253 at p.283. 31 Ironically, advances in technology have compounded the contradictory trends in the relationship between the law of evidence and police accountability. Technologies such as DNA hold the promise of greater transparency and objectivity in the investigation of offences. However, the generation of scientific evidence and its incorporation within the trial process can itself result in obfuscation and the infringement of rights. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in S and Marper 32 is a telling reminder of the need for State authorities to tread carefully when marshalling technology to the engine of criminal investigation. The European Court held that the indefinite retention by the UK authorities of the fingerprints and DNA material of "one-time suspects" (persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing but ultimately not convicted of any offence) interfered with the suspects" right to respect for private life as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. 33 The European Court"s condemnation of the UK regime puts in doubt the relatively recent changes in Irish law governing the retention of fingerprints [7; s.8(1), 10; s.49] and casts a shadow over aspects of the Government"s proposed legislative foundation for the establishment of a DNA database [11] . 34 Unfortunately, the application of some other forms of technology to Irish policing has also been a source of controversy. Whereas the electronic recording of custodial interviews was canvassed as a measure designed specifically to promote transparency and accountability, its implementation in practice has been tardy and lacklustre. This prompted Hardiman J. to comment in People (DPP) v Connolly:
…It is clear from the history of legal and legislative concern with uncorroborated confessions over a period of nearly two decades that legislators and judges alike have emphasised the importance of the audio visual recording of interviews. This is routine in most First World common law countries. Its failure to become routine, or even remotely to approach that status in this country, nearly twenty years after statutory provision for it was first made has ceased to be a mere oddity and is closely approaching the status of an anomaly. … The Courts have been very patient, perhaps 31 For analysis of the case, see [33; paras.6.37-6.43]. It is interesting to note the European Court"s rejection of the view that the UK Government should be accorded some leeway by virtue of its position in the vanguard of the development of DNA for purposes of crime detection. Ibid at paras 111-112. 34 The judgment of the European Court also calls into question the garda practice of seeking samples outside the statutory scheme which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Boyce. The Irish Bill purports to place the taking of samples on an exclusively statutory footing. It would seemingly roll back the common law power by prohibiting the gardaí from taking samples from suspects other than in accordance with the terms of the Bill [11: s.26] .
excessively patient, with delays in this regard. The time cannot be remote when we will hear a submission that, absent extraordinary circumstances (by which we do not mean that a particular garda station has no audio visual machinery or that the audio visual room was being painted) it is unacceptable to tender in evidence a statement which has not been so recorded.
[2003] 2 Irish Reports 1 at 17-18.
Developments in contemporary practice have rendered the custodial interview a complex terrain for the gathering of evidence, whether in the form of statements or silence. 35 The 40 The court held that there was no unfairness in the applicant"s trial for membership of the IRA where the defence was prevented from cross-examining a garda chief superintendent as to the source of his belief that the applicant had been a member 35 In People (DPP) v Breen [2008] IECCA 136 (16 December 2008) , the Court of Criminal Appeal set a noteworthy precedent regarding the contexts in which questioning may legitimately take place where the answers given will be used not only for investigative purposes but also as prosecution evidence at any subsequent trial. The court overturned a conviction where the prosecution had relied on verbal statements made by the appellant while he had been physically restrained by the gardaí but before he had been formally arrested and detained. at the material time. Writing for the majority, Geoghegan J recalled the traditional justification for the restriction on the rights of the defence inherent in belief evidence:
[I]t is perfectly clear that the legislation has been passed in the context of preserving the security of the State and the legitimate concern that it will not in practice be possible in many, if not most cases, to adduce direct evidence from lay witnesses establishing the illegal membership. Such witnesses will not come forward under fear of reprisal. The Special Criminal Court was itself established to avoid the mischief of juror coercion and intimidation. In relation to all anti-terrorist offences, as a matter of common sense, there would be equal apprehension about intimidation of witnesses.
[2006] 3 Irish Reports 115 at 121.
Whether belief evidence remains strictly necessary some three decades following its enactment and several years after the formal cessation of hostilities in Northern Ireland remains an open question. 41 The Court of Criminal Appeal has buttressed Kelly by affirming the compatibility of belief evidence and informer privilege with Article 6(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 42 Analysis of the relevant Strasbourg case law suggests that the issue is by no means as straightforward as the Irish jurisprudence would suggest [19] . Recent legislative initiatives to combat gangland crime have added fuel to this fire by sanctioning an additional and potentially broader species of belief evidence. Section 71B(1) of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009 inserts into the Criminal Justice Act 2006 a new provision rendering admissible the opinion of a member or former member of the gardaí who appears to the court to be an "appropriate expert" as to the existence of a particular criminal organization [6] .
Concluding Remarks
The law of evidence plays a direct role in police governance in so far as it sets legal standards that govern the manner in which the gardaí gather evidence in the investigative process. The courts also contribute indirectly by attaching evidentiary consequences to infractions of legal rules and infringements of personal rights and by excluding from the ambit of admissible evidence any information rendered unreliable by the taint of irregularity. In carrying out their constitutional and evidentiary responsibilities, the courts have an opportunity to promote best practice in law enforcement. The snapshots of practice outlined in this paper suggest inconsistent and contradictory trends in the relationship between the law of evidence and police governance. In the contemporary debate about governance and accountability, there is scope for reflection on the role of the legislature in fashioning evidentiary rules and the role of the courts in implementing them just as in legislative and judicial practice, there is scope for more directed, constructive engagement with these issues.
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The issue whether to repeal belief evidence divided the (6 December 2007) .
